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Increasing Problem Solving Capacity Between Organizations:
The Role of Information i!!. Managing the May lL.. 1985
Tornado Disaster in Western Pennsylvania

I. The Problem: Extending Problem Solving Capacity Between Organizations
Fitting the unique capabilities and limitations of human decision makers
to the systematic requirements of interorganizational problem solving is
difficult in stable environments.

In the dynamic, uncertain environment of

emergency management, the problem escalates in geometric proportion to the scale
of the emergency.

Yet, as the size and complexity of the emergency increases,

the need for interorganizational problem solving becomes imperative for
effective action.

How to extend problem solving capacity between organizations

in the complex environment of an actual disaster is a recurring dilemma in the
interjurisdictional emergency management process.

Tne difficulties are

compounded by significant" differences in training, facil ities, experiences and
conceptual understanding of the requirements for action at the diverse levels of
government involved in the emergency management process.

As the locus of

decision making shifts from city to county to state to federal levels of
government and back again in a major disaster, public personnel unfamiliar with
the working environments and cultural mores of other governmental organizations
and jurisdictions are expected to work together smoothly and efficiently
according to a rationally designed organizational plan.

In practice, problem

solving capacity drops repeatedly as public service personnel move from familiar
operating conditions across organizational boundaries into more complex,
uncertain and dynamic settings (Comfort, 1985).
This problem, documented in actual emergency operations settings (Rubin,
1985; Com for t, 1985 ), chal 1 eng es est ab 1 ish ed p 1ansf 0 r i nt er 0 r gani zat ion a 1
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corrmand and control (Giuffrida, 1983).

The- Federa 1 Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) has clearly delineated a set of mission responsibilities for each level
of government involved in the emergency management process (McLoughlin, 1985).
This official designation of emergency functions is further augmented by
emergency

~lans

at state, county and city levels.

Emergency planning is

supported by legal requirements, resulting in at 'least formal recognition of its
utility by jurisdiction at all levels. 1
This recurring decrease in problem solving capacity in the component
parts of a multiorganizational. system runs counter, also, to observations of
multiorganizational response to certain kinds of demands in particular disaster
settings. Thomas Drabek et ale (1981) describe emergent multiorganizational
networks in search and rescue operations following the occurrence of a natural
disaster.

Drabek et ale (1981:243) state:

Emergehcy. managers must recognize that disaster responses in American
society are multiorganizational, emergent and frequently require
improvisation.

.

Emergent multiorganizational networks responding to natural disasters in
American society are loosely coupled systems. and will remain so.
In us ing the term, 'emergent', Drabek et a 1. connote a natura 1, evo 1 ving set of
linkages among the participating organizations that omits prior recognition of
emergency responsibilities and
capacity.

pr~vious

assessment of organizational performance

This analysis does recognize that organizations learn through

interaction with other organizations engaged in emergency response activities.
Missing, however, is acknowledgement of a stated plan for interorganizational
emergency response and the

di~crepancy

between the stated plan and actual

performance.
In their study, Drabek et al. mapped the number and type of interactions
among a mix of public organizations with emergency responsibilities, voluntary
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organizations that offered their services and individuals who volunteered their
time and skills.

Yet, these researchers studied only a particular phase of the

emergency management process with a single, clear focus, search and rescue, and
they selected remote areas as their research settings. While their findings
characterize the patterns of search and rescue operations in these settings,
they do not appear consistent with the more complex interactions among public
organizations over the full range of intergovernmental functions in the
emergency management process.

Their findings appear to draw upon the mores of

cooperation and mutual assistance characteristic of small towns and rural
communities.

In contrast, these norms may not apply to organizational

interaction in more complex urban settings where the members have had little
previous interaction or personal contact (Comfort, 1983).
In practice, neither the formal allocation of specific mission
responsibil ities for organizations across jurisdictional boundaries by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency nor the identification of developmental
processes between organizations by Drabek et al. explain fully the task of
building interorganizational problem solving capacity in emergency management.
This paper addresses the larger set of interorganizational operations in
emergency management and the effects of planning and interaction in the predisaster phases of mitigation and preparedness upon the capacity for effective
interorganizational performance in the post-disaster phases of response and
recovery.
The thesis of this paper is that interorganizational problem sol ving
capacity increases as the flow of information, articulation of professional
norms for selecting and interpreting relevant information, interpersonal
communication and regular opportunities for reflection and redesign of
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performance increase among the participating organizations. These activities
are not likely to 'occur without design between organizations across
jurisdictional boundaries, particularly in large scale emergency operations
(Simon, 1969, 1981).

Information, in this process, plays an integrating role,

as it circulates within and between participating organizations.

Flowing

through open and two-way communication processes among the participating
organizations, information creates a basis of shared understanding of emergency
requirements and supports norms for collective action in the emergency
management

syst~m.

The abi 1ity' to gather, process and disseminate information

quickly and accurately through the multijurisdictional emergency management
system serves to reduce uncertainty at each governmental level, thereby
increasing the effectiveness of performance for the system as a whole.

Without

systematic design of interorganizational learning processes, problem solving
capacity between organizations tends to decrease under conditions of uncertainty
and complexity.
II. The Concept of Interorganizational Problem Solving
The concept of interorganizational problem solving is a construct derived
from observing a set of actions, individual and organizational, directed
s imu 1taneous 1y toward so 1vi ng different aspects of the same 1arge, comp 1ex
problem.

While the scope of the problem extends beyond any single individual or

organization's capacity to address, a solution is produced from multiple
contributio~s

of information, time and skill.

When the task of marshal ling and

sequencing these concurrent problem solving activities involves multiple
organizations and governmental jurisdictions as in the emergency management
system, problem solving assumes a level of complexity and dynamic interaction
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that demands an appropriate conceptual framework.

Yet, interorganizational

problem solving is intrinsically dependent upon individual problem solving
capacity, and is subject to the same constraints set by patterns of human
cognition and memory.
Problem solving between organizations, as for individuals, is essentially
a process of discovering "what works" under specific conditions with particular
resourcas and constraints.

Herbert Simon (1977:151) describes the problem

solving process as:
.••a process of selective trial and error, using heuristic rules derived
from previous experience, that are sometimes successful in discovering means
that are more or less efficacious in attaining some end. It is legitimate
to regard the imperatives embodying the means as 'derived' in some sense
from the imperatives embodying the ends, but the process of derivation is
not a deductive process, it is one of discovery •..
Central to this problem of discovery is establishing a clear connection between
actions and their consequences (Simon, 1977:146).

Direct feedback from actions

taken allows individuals to assess the consequences, thereby determining the
utility of their actions.

If effective, the action is likely to be discarded in

favor of an alternative.

In moving from indivtdual to organizational action,

the feedback 1 inkage becomes less direct.

It is less certain what actions by

which individuals produce what consequences. The connection between actions and
consequences becomes even more tenuous in moving from orgal')izational to
interorganizational problem solving.
performance drops.

It is at this point that problem solving

Trials made in error are not corrected.

Information

essential to appropriate action is not transmitted to relevant participants.
Uncerta inty regarding the outcome of proposed act ions increases, and 1earn ing
among the participants decreases.
Discovering solutions to complex problems is a dynamic process,
especially as it occurs between multiple organizations.

Four principal
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components interact in this process, with varying levels of intensity and
infl uence upon the participating organizations over time.

First, the' flow of

information within and between the participating organizations is essential to
determining if, and what kind, of problem exists.

The style, content and

direction of this information flow is critical to eliciting the attention and
cooperation of participant organizations in the problem search (Klauss and Bass,
1982).

of

Second, the articulation of professional norms serves the vital function

s~reening

the flow of information by a commonly accepted

se~

of criteria to

select those elements in the situation that are central to the problem and that
require the most immediate al location of attention and resources.

Without some

means of interpreting incpming information within the context of the
organizations' operating environment, additional information tends to overwhelm
rather than inform decision making capacity between organizations (Comfort,
1985).

This tendency is magnified under conditions of uncertainty, when

information processing requirements for decision making in organizations tend to
increase (Cheng & McK in 1ey, 1983).
The third component, interpersonal communication, drives the dynamic of
the the process.

In mobilizing the attention, commitment and coordinated action

of multiple participants in a complex problem solving process, the quality and
style of interpersonal communication is vital (Klauss & Bass, 1982).

Motivating

participants to overcome the initial doubt, incomplete understanding and
resistance to change inherent in any problem solving process is indeed more art
than science, and the task is complicated even more by the involvement of
multiple organizations.
factor" (Nelson

&

In environments of relative stability, the "personal

Yates, eds., 1978) contributes substantially to creating the

common understanding and trust among individuals necessary for joint action.

In
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environments of high uncertainty, this quality of interpersonal trust is
essential for collective action.

Building that trust in.a multiorganizational

operating environment is a complex process, perhaps the most difficult task
involved in creating an integrated emergency management system.

Extending trust

is inherently a voluntary act, and withholding trust, despite executive orders,
administrative regulations or policy statements, is a time-honored mechanism of
resistance to change.

Recognizing that effective problem solving in

environments of high uncertainty requires building a set of relationships among
the participant:; based upon a common objective and shared cOmnlitments, rather
than externa 1 requirements, is a crucia 1 first step in generating this trust
(Schoonhoven, 1981). Authority among the participa'nts shifts from a base of
force to one of 'wisdom or spirit ' (Tonnies, 1887, 1957), and incentives for
individual action within the group shift from maximizing control through
increasing one's power over others to maximizing effectiveness by increasing
one's understanding of the problem and acting accordingly.
Creating such a basis for collective action between organizations
invol ves extending the reciprocal, binding relationships characteristic of
commun ity or 'gemeinschaft ' (Tonn ies, 1887, 1957) , into the 1arger, more comp 1ex
relationships characteristic of society or 'gesellschaft.'

Tonnies (1887,

1957:47) referred to the distinctive common bond among the members of a

community as 'consensus' or 1I ... the specia 1 socia 1 force and sympathy which
keeps human beings together as members of a totality.1I

To Tonnies, consensus or

understanding was built through language, Dr the conscious expression of IIdeep
feelings and prevailing thoughts II among members of the cOlT1T1unity.

While clearly

there are constraints of time and opportunity for intimate expression of
personal thoughts in large, complex organizations, interpersonal communication

8

necessarily occurs.

The style of communications within and between

organizational participants may either inyite expression of differing
perceptions of a given problem and encourage active engagement in responsible
social action, or it may discourage such reciprocal problem solving activity.
Finally, regular opportunities for reflection on actual performance and
redesign of actions based upon incoming information complete the learning cycle,
within as well as between organizations (Argyris, 1982).

While such

opportunities may occur naturally in smaller communities, they require design in
larger, more

cc~plex

organizational environments (Simon, 1969, 1981).

Competing

demands for attention from many participants engaged in diverse activities tend
to diffuse the common focus on a single problem (Cohen, March & Olsen, 1971),
and the problem solving capacity of both individuals and organizations drops.
When the problem is complex, as in a natural disaster, and constraints upon time
and resources are severe, the effectiveness of coordinated action depends upon
the extent to which multiple organizations can concurrently identify problems in
their respective performances and-adjust their actions accordingly in order to
accomplish their shared goal (Cohen, 1981, 1984).
In summary, the concept of interorganizational
problem solving moves the
,
level of interaction among individuals to a magnitude of abstraction that
exceeds the limits of human short-term memory and information processing
capacity.

The mode 1 of an integrated emergency management system, based upon

this concept, simply exceeds the cognitive abilities of human decision makers,
without technical assistance.

The problems generated by a natural disaster are

so large and so complex, they strain the problem solving capacity of managers
using standard administrative practices of command and control.

Opportunities

for error increase geometrically with the scope of the disaster, and chances of
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identifying and correcting them in timely fashion through traditional
administrative means are remote.

This recurring strain upon interorganizational

problem solving capacity was vividly demonstrated in the emergency management
process activated in response to the May 31,1985 tornado disaster in Western
Pennsylvania.
III. Interorganizational Problem Solving in the Western Pennsylvania
Tornado Disaster, May 31, 1985
Early in the evening of May 31, 1985, a series of tornadoes struck
Western Pennsyl vania with devastating force.

In less than five hours, four

separate sets of tornadoes ripped through thirteen counties, destroying
virtually everything in their paths.

The tornadoes left 64 people dead and
caused an estimated $232 mil lion loss in property damage. 2 Confronted with
massive destruction, local and state officials moved immediately to request a
presidential declaration of disaster in order to implement the federal policies
on disaster relief and recovery in thw shattered communities.

On June 3, 1985,
President Reagan declared 10 counties in Wester~ Pennsylvania a disaster area. 3

The pres ident's dec 1arat ion activated the federa 1 government's po 1 icies in the
recovery and reconstruction phases of the disaster, and at that point, the
entire interjurisdictional emergency management system became actively involved
in coping with the demands of the disaster.
The tornado disaster provided a sobering but timely example of efforts to
implement an interorganizational cooperation and coordination to meet the needs
of the affected famil ies, towns and counties. The degree of devastation was
such that no single individual, organization or jurisdiction could cope with it
alone.

The full complement of policies, plans and resources available through

the interjurisdictional emergency management system directed by the FEMA was in
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effect.

In short, the best efforts of current administrative policies and

practices were placed in operation in response to this disaster.

To what extent

did the expected interorganizational problem solving occur, and what are the
requirements of interorganizational problem solving in an actual disaster?

This

disaster created an unusual opportunity to observe the activation of the
interorganizational emergency management process and to assess its capacity for
problem solving.

To do so, this researcher, with the assistance of co-

instructor Anthony G. Cahi 11 and 16 graduate students in the Pol icy Seminar,
Spring Term, 1985, at the Graduate School of Publ ic and Internationa·l Affairs,
University of Pittsburgh, conducted a study of problem solving in the emergency
manag.ement process as it operated in the tornado disaster in Western
Pennsylvania.
The study focused on the role of information in emergency management.

As

researchers, we were interested in ident ifying the amount and types of
information available to decision makers,

as well as the patterns of

interpretation, communication and application of this information to solving
problems at different levels of decision making in the emergency management
process.

In the study, three groups of decision makers were interviewed: 95

citizens who experienced the disaster and who confronted the problems of
protecting themselves and their families; 139 local government officials from 7
of the 10 affected counties in Western Pennsylvania who had the legal
responsibility for first response in their communities; and 10 federal officials
who were responsible for administering federal programs of disaster assistance
in the thirteen counties struck by tornadoes in federal Region III, which
includes Pennsylvania.
Reviewing the findings in light of the four components identified in the
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construct of interorganizational problem solving, several major discrepancies
appear between theory and practice in the implementation of the emergency
management pol icies and plans.

In reference to the first component, the open

flow of information within and between organizations, the evidence clearly
documents a lack of information available to decision makers at each level of
problem solving as they confronted the demands of the disaster.

At the

citizens' level, lack of information about the approaching tornadoes or what to
do in case of a tornado very seriously restricted their ability to take
effective measures to protect themselves and their families.

Table 1 cites the

finding that 63 out of 88 citizens responding to the question, or 71.6%,
reported receiving less than 5 minutes· warning before the tornado struck.
5 citizens, or
they occurred.

~.7%,

Only

learned of the approaching tornadoes an hour or more before

When asked how they learned of the approaching tornado, 60.4% of

those citizens responding"to the question reported that they learned from
family, friends or neighbors.

These data are cited in Table 2.

Only 2

citizens, or 3.2%, learned of the approaching tornadoes through public sirens or
emergency warn i ng systems.
In contrast, Tables 3, 4 and 5 cite data from the local officials' survey
in response to similar questions.

Of the 139 local officials included in this

survey, 93 were actively invol ved in disaster response activities in their
communities.

Of the 91 active participants responding to the question, 22, or

24.2%, learned of the tornado more than an hour before it occurred, while 30, or
33%, had less than five minutes· warning.
59 minutes' warning.

An additional 35.2% had between 5 and

When asked how they learned of a tornado in their

vicinity, nearly half (48.9%) of the local officials reported publ ic sources of
emergency information: fire radio, National Weather Service, County Dispatch
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Table 1
Time of Citizens' Reception of Tornado Warning,
Western Pennsylvania, May 31, 1985
"When did you first learn that a tornado was in your vicinity?"
N

3-4 hours
2-3 hours
1-2 hours
30-59 minutes
15-29 minutes
.5-14 minutes
Less than 5 minutes
No warning .
Afterwards
No respo~e

Valid cases: 88
Missing cases: 7

~I.

1
2
2
2
8
8
63
0
2
7

1.1
2.1
2.1
2.1
8.4
8.4
66.3
.0.0
2.1
7.4

95

100.0

A~j.

1.1
2.3
2.3
2.3
9.1
9.1
71.6
0.0
2.3
Missing

100.0

Table 2
Sources of" Citizens' Tornado Warning, Western Pennsylvania,
May 31, 1985
"How did you learn that a tornado was in your vicinity?"

Heard it
Saw it
Family
Friend/neighbor
Radio
TV

Siren
Emergency warning
No response
Valid cases: 64
Missing cases: 31

ReI.

Adj.

N

%

%

3

13
1
1
31

3.0
22.1
3.2
11.6
11.6
13.7
1.1
1.1
32.6

4.7
33.8
4.7
17.2
17.2
20.8
1.6
1.6

95

100.0

21

3

11
11

Missing

100.0
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Table 3
Time of Local Officials' Rece~tion of Tornado Warning,
Western Pennsylvania, May 31, 1985
"When did you first learn that a tornado was in your vicinity?"
-ReI.

~eq.

N

4-6 hours

1

3-4 hours
2-3 hours
1-2 hours
30-.59 minutes
1.5-29 minutes
5-14 minutes
Less than 5 minutes
No warning
Afterwards
Other
No res~onse

2
1

%

o

1.1
2.2
1.1
19.4
6.5
10.8
17.2
32.3
1.1.
6.5
0.0

2

2.2

93

100.0

18
6
10
16
30
1

6

1.1
2.2
1.1
19.8

6.6

11.0
17.5
33.0
1.1
6.5
0.0
Missing
100.0

Valid cases: 91
Missing cases: 2
Table 4
Sources of Local Officials' Tornado Warning,
Western Pennsylvania, May 31~ 1985
"How did .you learn .that a tornado was in your vicinity?"

Jfl.eq.
Fire radio
National Weather Service
County emergency dispatch system
Public emergency broadcast system/
Siren/bell
Communication from de~artment or
~ublic service ~ersonnel
Television broadcast
Radio news
C.B. radio
Neighbor, friend, relative
Other
No res~onse

Valid cases: 76
Missing cases: 17

*~q.
%

N

%

5
4
33

3.8
4.3
35.5

4.9
5.3
43.4

2

2.2

2.6

10
9
4
1
7
14
3

10.8
9.7
4.3
1.1
7.5
15.1
3.2

13.2
11.8
5.3
1.3
9.2
Missing
Missing

9J

100.0

100.0
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Table 5
Actions Taken by Local Officials in Response to Tornado
Warning, Western Pennsylvania, May 31, 1985
"What did you do when you realized the tornado was actually
coming toward. you?"

Tried to warn community
Tried to contact other public
service personnel
Tried to contact family members
Tried to warn friends and. neighbors
Sought shelter immediately
Other
Did not believe there was any
dangel.-

N

%

47

29.4

18
30
16
16
21

11.2
18.8
10.0
10.0
13.1

12

7.5

160*

100.0

*Multiple responses coded
N of cases: 93
Table 6
Actions Taken by Local Officials Directed toward. Citizens in Response
to Tornado Warning, Western PennsylVania., May 31, 1985
"What means, if any, did you use to alert citizens to the approaching
tornado?"
N

Community warning system
Public emergency broadcasting
system
Vehicle with loudspeaker
Telephone ring-down
House-to-house canvass
Other

*Multiple responses coded
N of cases: 93

%

24

24.0

16
15
18
13
14

16.0
15.0
18.0
13.0
14.0

100*

100.0
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systems or community emergency broadcast system or siren.

An add it iona 1 10.8%

learned of the tornado through communication from their department or other
public service personnel.
Further t half of the local officials actively involved in the disaster t
47 out of 93 (50.5%) reported they tried to warn their communities of the
approaching tornado t and 40 out of 93 (43%) reported they used the community
warning system or publ ic emergency broadcasting system.

Table 5 presents the

actions taken by public officials t reporting multiple responses and Table 6
cites the means used by local officials to alert citizens in their communities t
again reporting multiple responses.

These data reveal a serious discrepancy

between the efforts of local officials to warn the citizens in their communities
of the approaching danger and the citizens' reception of this information.
Clearly the flow of information between local officials and citizens did not
adequately facilitate problem solving t as both groupst individually and organizationallYt sought to respond to the staggering demands of the tornado disaster.
At the federal level t the same discontinuity in the information flow
affects the problem solving process adversely in the intergovernmental
administration of disaster relief.

Of the ten federal officials interviewed in

this surveYt most found the level of information available to them regarding
characteristics of the tornado-stricken counties middling at best and tending
toward low or no information.

Table 7 cites the findings on this issue.

In

contrast t federal officials readily identified the kinds of information that
w0 u1d ha ve bee n he 1pf u1 tot hem in the iradmin i st rat ion
assistance programs.

0f

fed era 1 dis as t er

Table 8 cites these data.

Esp ecia 11Y s i 9n if i can tis the com par i son

0f

a vail ab1e t 0 des ire d

information regarding emergency plans for local government, as shown in Tables 7
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and 8.

Under federal guidelines for the integrated emergency management system,

each community is expected to develop its own emergency plan and relay it to the
next level of government, the county.

The county, in turn, develops an

emergency plan for its jurisdictional responsibilities, incorporating plans and
information from the set of communities within its boundaries into its data
base.

The counties relay this information on to the state, which, in sequence,

passes it on to the federal administration in emergency management.

According

to the official plan, federal officials should have full access to vital
characteristics regarding communities involved in any disaster.

The data

presented in Table 7 show that only 3 out of 10 federal officials rated the data
available to them regarding the local counties as high (4 or 5) on a scale of
completeness ranging from 5 to 1.

Table 8 shows that 5 of the 7 officials

responding to this question reported that information regarding emergency plans
for local governments would have been very helpful (4 or 5 on a 5-point scale)
in their work. Again, these data reveal that the present flow of information
does not adequately support the problem solving process between jurisdictional
levels in the emergency management process.
In further analysis of the responses from citizens, local officials and
federal officials engaged in problem solving at their respective levels of
involvement in the emergency management process, the data cite little support
for the other three components identified as integral to effective
interorganizational problem solving.

In reference to the articulation of

pro f es s ion a 1 norm s t 0 ass i stin scr eeni ng and pro ce ssin gin for mat ion t 0
facilitate problem solving, 44.5% of the citizens interviewed reported that they
"never got information" from public officials or agencies about what to do in a
tornado.

Table 9 cites the data in response to this question.

Fewer citizens,

17
Table 7
Types and Completeness of Information Available to Federal
Officials in Managing Disaster Relief, Western Pennsylvania,
May 31, 1985 Tornadoes
"How complete was the inf'ormation that you had regarding vital
characteristics of counties in Western Pennsylvania?" Please
rate from 5 = complete information to 1 = no inf"ormation.

Population characteristics
Infrastructure: roads,
bridges, tunnels
Industrial plants, construction
Emergency plans for local
governments
Residential concentrations
Medical facilities
Utilities
Transportation acce~s:
airport, ra.1lways, heliport
Public broadcasting stations
Other
N of cases: 10
NR = No Response

!!!L Total

.i

4

.l-

2

1

2

4

2

1

1

0

10

0

1

2

2

4

1

10

0

0

1

4

4

1

10

2

1

2

1
0
0

2

3
3

1
0

1

4
1

4

2

2

3

1

1
0
1
2

10
10
10
10

2

:3

2
2

1

0
1
0

10
10

2
0
0

4
1

1
0

0

3

2
2

3

This page
•

IS

blank
or
•

•

missing
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Table 8
Types of Information about Local Communities Desired by Federal
Officials in the Administration of Disaster Relief, Western
Pennsylvania, May 31, 1985 Tornadoes
''What kinds of information would have been most helpful to tyou in
assessing the impact of the tornadoes upon the communities of Western
Pennsylvania?" Please rate from 5 = most helpful to 1 = least helpful.
Most
Least
Helpful
Helpful
...2..
4
-L
2
1
NR
Population characteristics
Infrastructure: roads, bridges,
tunnels
Industrial plants; construction
Emergency plans for local governments
Residential concentrations
Medical facilities
Utilities
Transportation access: airport,
railways, heliport
Public broadcasting system
Other
Valid cases: 9
Missing case: 1
NR = No Response

Total

6

1

1

0

1

0

9

1

0

1

.9

2

3

1

1

0

9

4
4

2

0

1
4
4

1
1

1

5

1

9
9
9

0

3

2

0
0

3

1
1

0

0

0
0
0

2

1

3
3

2

0
0

0
0

0

1

2
2

1

1

1

2

2

3

0

0

9

9
9

o
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but still nearly 30%, reported they received no information from publ ic
officials regarding other kinds of emergencies.
Table 10.

These data are presented in

More vivid were the responses from citizens who .voluntarily stated

they had "never seen a tornado before" and ';didn't know what to do.,,4

In

contrast, 67% of the citizens, as shown in Table 11, stated that warning systems
would have helped them most to protect themsel ves, their fami 1 ies and their
property from the tornado.

The majority of citizens acknowledged that the

introduction of professional means of identifying the level
emergencies would help them to take protective measures.

of risk in

Without public

education to assist citizens in interpreting the symptoms of a tornado and in
taking appropriate safety measures, emergency warnings or pUbl ic announcements
by local officials have little effect.
When asked for their professional judgment regarding the effectiveness of
the emergency plans in their communities, only 11.8% of the local officials who
participated in disaster response activities reported "very effective."

Nearly

twice that proportion, 22.6%, of the officials reported the plans in their
cOlMlunities to be "not so effective; not at all effective" or reported "no plan
in community."

These data, cited in Table 12, show that local officials were

operating to meet the demands of the disaster in their communities without the
degree of professional planning that would have facil itated their emergency
response process.
Federa 1 offi cia 1s, as we 11, reported the need for better management of
information among the organizations participating in the emergency response and
reco very proces s. 5

I nd i v idua 1 comments s ta ted the des i rab il ity of more

professional training and interaction between the jurisdictional levels in the
emergency management system.
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Table 9
Citizens' Reception of Information from Public Officials
Regarding Tornado Emergencies, Western Pennsylvania, May
31, 1985 Disaster
"Have you ever gotten information from public officials or agencies
about what to do in a tornado? If so, how?"

%

.JL
Public education program
Brochures
Public announcements
Television
Radio
School
Prior knowledge, intuition
Never got information
Other sources of information

10
6
7
15
11
4
5
48
2
108*

9.4
5.2
6.5
13.9
10.3
3.7
4.6

.44.5
1.9
100.0

*Multiple responses coded;
missing data excluded
N of cases: 95
Table 10 .
Citizens' Reception of Information from Public Officials
Regarding Other Emergencies, Western Pennsylvania, May
31, 1985 Disaster
"Have you ever gotten information from public officials or agencies
about what to do if other kinds of emergencies happen? If so, how?"

N
Public education program
Brochures
Public announcements
Television
Radio
School
Prior knowledge, intuition
Never got information
Other

*Multiple responses coded;
missing data excluded
N of cases: 95

11
6
9

37
16
1
2

38
7
127*

%
8.7
4.7
7.1
29.1
12.6

.8
1.6
29.9
5.5
100.0

16 17.8

1

3

7

Helped Hoderately

tlelped Sooewhat
(3)

Helped Little

Uelpe<1 Least

ToUI Cases

Invalid Cases
( Hissing Data)

95

9.9

4.4

8.8

9.9

67

S

S

6.7

61.1

S

11.1

4.4

10

..!
95

-5
95
95
95

95

90 100.0

10

4

9

12: 13.3

55

H

Utility
Connections

-4

90 100.0

9 10

6

13 14.4

13 14.4

49 54.4

H

First Aidl
Hedlc1ne

-5

91. 100.0

9

4

8

9

61

H

Other
Warntng
Systems
jSlrens. etc.)

-4

90 100.0

91 100.0

Total Valid Cases 90 100.0

-5

24 26.7

(1)

(2)

14 15.4

13 14.4

10 11,1

12 13.3

7.8

1.7

5.5

8.8

31 34.3

1

5

8

57 62.2

S

H

N
S

'lot lines

Radto
Warning

3.3

(4)

1.8

57 63.3

(5)

Helped Host

1

Safety
Heasures

H

11

·WY KINOS Of INFORMATION WOULD UAVE HELPED YOU PROTECT
YOURSELF, YOUR FAMILY OR PROPERTY FROH TilE TORNADO BETTER1 M

T,_.~

~

6.5

2.2

3.3

9.8

95

-3

92 "100.0

6

2

3

9

72 78.3

N

fami ly
Safety
Plan

N
N
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In reference to interpersonal communication, the third requirement of
interorganizational problem solving, the data suggest that respondents at each
level of the emergency management system communicate more easily and frequently
with participants at their own level than with participants at other levels,
despite the inter jurisdictional demands of the emergency management process.
Table 13 reports that the largest group of citizens turned first to family,
friends or neighbors for assistance after the tornado.

While nearly one-third,

32.3%, of the local officials reported that local, state and federal agencies

worked to

gathe~,

analyze and share needed information"quite or very effective-

ly, approximately one-fifth, 19.4%, stated that agencies at the three different
levels of government worked not so effectively or not at all effectively to meet
information needs.

More significantly, one-fourth of the local officials,

25.8%, did not respond to this question, demonstrating a rel uctance to make a

judgment about the effectiveness of interagency performance on this critical
task.

These data are presented in Table 14.

At the federal level, officials

reported the need for continual interchange of information among participating
publ ic agencies to improve the emergency management process. At the Disaster
Field Office in Meadville, Pennsyl vania, the Federa 1 Coordinating Officer
scheduled daily staff meetings to coordinate information within and between
federa 1 and state agencies. 6

These findings document the importance of inter-

personal communication in the dynamic operating environment of a disaster.
On the final requirement for an effective interorganizational problem
solving process, reflection and redesign, all three groups surveyed evidenced
thoughtful

review of the process.

Of the citizen respondents,

77% had

suggestions for change, focusing primarily on better means of information flow,
professional planning and education.

These data are cited in Table 15.

Among

24

Table 12
Perceived Effectiveness of Community Emergency Plans,
Local Officials Involved in Response Activities, Western
Pennsylvania, May 31, 1985 Tornado Disaster
"In your professional judgment, how effective was the emergency plan
in your community for the assignment of emergency responsibilities
and coordination of action among public service agencies?"
Rel.
Freq •
N

Very effective
Quite effective
Moderately effective
Not so e!:fective
Not at all effective
Plan not activated
No plan in community
Other
No response

.1L.

11

11.8

22
27

23.7
29.0
8.6
4.3
4.3
9.7
3.2
5.4
100.0

8
4
4
9

3
5

93

12.9
25.9
31.7
9.4
4.7
4.7
10.6
Missing
Missing

100.0

Valid cases: 85
Missing cases: 8
Table 13
Communication Patterns in Requesting Disaster Assistance,
Citizens' Survey, Western Pennsylvania, May 31, 1985 Tornadoes
"Just after the tornado passed , what did you do to get help?"
N
Assistance came to me
Went to, or called, local officials
Went to, or called, Red Cross
Went to, or called, family, friends
or neighbors
Went to, or called, church or church
members
HelPed others
Other responses
Did not need help
Nothing; didn't Imow what to do

*Multiple responses coded;
missing data excluded
N of cases: 95

%

19
8
3

20.6
8.7
3.3

J4

37.0

2
4
13
3
6
92*

4.3
14.1
3.3
6.5
100.0

2.2
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Table 14
Local Officials' Perception of Intergovernmental Cooperation
Regarding Information Management, Western Pennsylvania, May
31, 1985 Tornado Disaster
"In your professional judgment, how effectively have local, state and
federal agencies worked to gather, analyze and share needed information
in this disaster?"
ReI.
Freq.

N

Very effectively
Quite effectively
Moderately effectively
Not so effectively
Not at all effectively
Other
No response

17
13
14
8
10
7
24

93

%
18.3
14.0
15.0
8.6
10.8
7.5
25.8
100.0

27.5
21.0
22.0
13.0
16.2
Missing
Missing
100.0

Table 15
Citizens' Suggestions for Public Action to Protect Community
in Future Emergencies, Western Pennsylvania, May 31, 1985
Tornado Disaster
"What suggestions would you make to public officials in order to
protect your community in future emergencies?"
ReI.
Freq •

N

Emergency management plan
Public education
Weather monitoring
Warning/siren system
Public response is satisfactory
Public response is not satisfactory
No response
Valid cases: 84
Missing cases:l1

10
17
7

39
9
2
11

95

...L
10.6
17.9
7.4
41.1

9.4
2.0
11.6
100.0

11.9
20.2
8.3

46.4

10.7
2.8
Missing
100.0
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local officials, 42% offered suggestions for change, emphasizing the need for
improved communication, organization, coordination and cooperation.?
officials stressed the importance of managing the information

fo~

Federal

their decision

process, recommending the utilization of appropriate computer technology to
assist in coping with both the great volume and rapid rate of change in
information involved in disaster management. 8 These findings document the
importance of reflection and redesign for the problem solving process. More
significant, they demonstrate that the participants in this tornado disaster are
aware of this need and are already engaging in reflection on how to improve the
problem solving process for future emergencies.

This is a critical stage for

the thoughtful review of performance at each level of the interorganizationa1
emergency management process and a necessary first step in its redesign for more
effective performance as a system.
IV. Requisite Conditions for Interorganizational Problem Solving
The data from the surveys of citizens, local officials and federal
officials involved in the tornado disaster in Western Pennsylvania underline the
importance of the four components identified earlier as essential to
interorganizationa 1 problem sol ving.

The information requirements for

interorganizational problem solving in a disaster of this magnitude and scope
overwhelmed the existing patterns of information flow, professional planning and
interpersonal corrununication.

Citizens, local officials and federal officials

found serious discrepancies between the amount and kinds of information
available to them and the amount and kinds of information that would have helped
them to meet the demands of the disaster more quickly, appropriately and
efficiently. Interorganizationa1 problem solving requires a distinctive mode of

27

information gathering, processing and dissemination that will extend human
problem solving capacities in complex, uncertain settings.
The most interesting finding of the study, however, is that significant
proportions of each group surveyed are aware of this discrepancy between
available and desired information.

This awareness, highest immediately

fol lowing a disaster, can serve as a vital element in initiating change at each
level in the intergovernmental emergency management process.

Advances in

telecommunications and computer technology provide the technical capability for
interorganizational decision support.
appropriate use becomes

central

Designing and implementing their

to the effective development of

interorganizational problem solving in an integrated emergency management
system.

Increasing the technical capacity to manage information would

facilitate and extend the substantial degree of interorganizational learning
demonstrated by citizens and public officials involved in the emergency response
and recovery activities following the Western Pennsylvania tornado disaster.
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NOTES
1The actual development of emergency plans at the county and'city levels
is somewhat problematic. In a recent inquiry into the status of emergency
planning in 16 major U.S. cities, four of the sixteen -- Pittsburgh, Boston,
Cleveland and Newark -- did not have emergency plans officially in place. Four
others, Atlanta, Minneapolis, Miami and St. Louis, were in various stages of
review and development of their plans and were not prepared to participate in
the survey. The latter four cities did, however, submit the emergency plans for
the counties in which they were located. Although this inquiry was not
comprehensive, it does indicate that 8 of the 16 cities in this selective survey
did not have fully developed and current emergency plans ready for operation.
The status of planning in smaller cities and rural communities is even less
developed, as evidenced by the responses of 139 local officials to a survey
following the May 31, 1985 tornado disaster in Western Pennsylvania. See "The
Role of Information in Emergency Management," Research Report, Pol icy Seminar
296A, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of
Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, July 23, 1985.
2pittsburgh Post Gazette, June 2, 1985.
3pittsburgh Post Gazette, June 4, 1985.
4Cit izen Interview, Hermitage, PA, June 15, 1985.
5Federal Officials· Survey, Disaster Field Office, Meadville, PA, June
14-30, 1985.
6This researcher observed 2 joint Federal-State staff meetings, with the
consent of the Disaster Coordinating Officer, at the Disaster Field Office in
Meadville, PA on Saturday, June 8, 1985 and Frid~y, June 14, 1985.
7Loca l Officials· Survey, Western Pennsylvania counties of Beaver,
Butler, Crawford, Erie, Forest, Mercer and Venango, June 15 - July 20, 1985.
8Federal Officials· Survey, Disaster Field Office, Meadville, PA, June
14-30, 1985.
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